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The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  cover  the  gap in literature  about  transparency  in  the  context  of  international
trade  facilitation.  It focuses  on  the  importance  of transparency  in  achieving  growth  in international  trade
and  the  differences  between  non-transparent  practices  and corruption  in  global  trade.  Managing  the
disclosure  of information  about  rules,  regulations  and  laws  is not  the  only  trade  policy instrument  where
transparency  becomes  important.  To  build  a framework  on  levels  of  transparency  we developed  a matrix
classifying  the  transparency  of  each  country  based  on  ease  of  doing  business  and  levels  of  bribery.  Four
different  strategies  are  explained  based  on the  different  scenarios  of  transparency  in  international  trade.
The main  conclusions  reﬂect  that  disclosure  of information  is  not  enough  to guarantee  transparency  and
monitoring  of transparency  must  be  improved.
©  2013  AEDEM.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  All  rights  reserved.
Un  marco  para  la  transparencia  en  el  comercio  internacional
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
El  objetivo  de  este  paper  es  cubrir  un hueco  en  la  literatura  sobre  transparencia  en el  contexto  interna-
cional.  Esta  investigación  se  centra  en  la  importancia  de  la transparencia  para  alcanzar  el  crecimiento  en  el
comercio  internacional  y resaltar  las  diferencias  entre  prácticas  no  transparentes  y corrupción.  Gestionar
la disponibilidad  de  información  sobre  procedimientos,  regulaciones  y leyes,  no  es la  única  manera  dealabras clave:
ransparencia
esponsabilidad
omercio internacional
orrupción
lograr  la  transparencia.  Para  construir  un marco  con los  niveles  de  transparencia,  presentamos  una  matriz
clasiﬁcando  la transparencia  entre  los distintos  países  basado  en  sus  niveles  de  sobornos  y  facilidad  para
hacer negocios.  Cuatro  diferentes  estrategias  en  comercio  internacional  son  posibles  de  desarrollar  en
torno a dicha  clasiﬁcación.  Las  principales  conclusiones  reﬂejan  que  la  publicación  de  información  no  es
suﬁciente  para garantizar  la  transparencia.
3  AEDoborno
acilitación del comercio
© 201
. IntroductionIn the coming years, all countries will face many challenges in
erms of trade facilitation. Customs will be globally networked,
ustoms procedures will be minimized and standardized, burden
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procedures will be made electronically, and the interoperability
among traders will increase enormously. These impending changes
are based on the basic principle of transparency in the rules for pro-
viding information and the clarity of appeal procedures (customs,
national authorities and courts). Researchers have become increas-
ingly interested in ways to reduce corruption; however, there is
not a consensus in the deﬁnition of transparency. The goal of this
paper is to provide insight into transparency in international trade,
to develop metrics to measure transparency and provide evidence
of the effects of transparency in reducing international trade costs.
ghts reserved.
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e  introduce a framework that combines well-known Indexes to
enerate a 2×2 Matrix of Transparency in International Trade to
roup countries and evaluate potential strategies in International
rade.
Trade facilitation encompasses actions in two main areas: hard
nd soft infrastructures. The former involves the long-term assets
hat allow the physical ﬂow of goods, and the latter is concerned
ith the assets, services and procedures that allow ﬁrms to trade
nternationally. Speciﬁcally, trade facilitation is comprised of three
ain parts. First, trade facilitation includes physical infrastruc-
ures such as ports, airports and roads among others. Second, trade
acilitation deals with customs and borders administrative pro-
esses, transport formalities, tariffs and the application of trade
aws and regulations. And third, trade facilitation involves the use
f information and communication technologies (ICT) to harmo-
ize and standardize trade procedures among countries and also
mong all stakeholders involved in international trade (e.g., sellers,
uyers, banks, traders, customs, etc.).
Soft infrastructures, especially non-tariff measures, have been
onsidered the most important methods of facilitating trade glob-
lly since the Uruguay Round reduced tariff barriers. Today’s
evolution of international trade is concerned with customs and
rade procedures. Now, the main mechanisms for facilitating trade
over transparency, predictability and consistency of procedures,
ormalities, as well as rules and laws relating to exports and
mports. Improving worldwide coordination and cooperation in
nternational trade and related services would reduce the trans-
ction costs, fostering the growth of global transactions.
. Brief history of transparency
Trade facilitation aims to simplify, standardize, harmonize, and
ake transparent the norms and practices involved in international
rade. The goals of transparency have increasingly become the focus
f international organizations and multilateral agreements. Key
greements about transparency are close at hand.
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
ublished in 1994, stated the commitment of the World Trade
rganization (WTO) to improve transparency through its internal
nd external communication. In this article, the WTO  promised
o make its operations more transparent through more effective
nd prompt dissemination of information and improved dialogue
ith stakeholders. The article also urged all members to publish
nd disseminate laws, regulations and judicial decisions that could
e relevant to trade abroad. The essential implication of the arti-
le is that no trade regulation could be applied unless it had been
ublished.
Following GATT, the Doha Ministerial Declaration in 2001 rec-
gnized the need for the clariﬁcation of three cornerstones of
nternational trade: non-discrimination, transparency, and pro-
edural fairness in interactions between trade and competition
olicies.
The Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC) of 2006 states that coun-
ries wishing to become contracting parties in this convention (as
f July 2013 there were 82) must accept the General Annex to the
KC which includes the following principles: (a) transparency and
redictability of customs actions; (b) standardization and simpli-
cation of the goods declaration and supporting documents; (c)
impliﬁed procedures for authorized persons; (d) maximum use of
nformation technology; (e) minimum necessary customs control
o ensure compliance with regulations; (f) coordinated interven-
ions with other border agencies; and (g) partnership among
embers of the supply chain (formal consultative relationships).
More recently, in 2009, the Organization of Economic Coop-
ration and Development (OECD) approved the Convention onirección y Economía de la Empresa 21 (2015) 1–8
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in International Busi-
ness Transactions (OECD, 2011). This Recommendation reinforces
international understanding and cooperation regarding bribery in
international trade transactions. At the same time, transparency
has become the minimum standard for accountability in both the
public and private sector (Smithe & Smith, 2006). Not coinciden-
tally, transparency can generate accountability (Fox, 2007).
These agreements create a framework for applying transparency
in international trade. Hence, transparency can be applied in three
ways: trade facilitation, consultation processes, and regulations.
Transparency enormously inﬂuences the way  goods are moved
across borders and along the full supply chain. Indeed, transparency
has become an essential component of trade facilitation. Further-
more, transparency is vital to the consultation processes among
private and public institutions to bring together the strengths of
both sectors and increase the efﬁciencies of international trade.
Finally, transparency refers to the elaboration, adoption and imple-
mentation of rules and the practices acquainting stakeholders with
the relevant measures affecting international trade.
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the study of trans-
parency within the international supply chain, especially in border
and “behind-the-border” measures. This paper contributes to an
examination of the way  those measures, rules, and policies are
administered with transparency. While a number of previous stud-
ies have examined the broader links between institutions and trade
(Smithe & Smith, 2006; Tibana, 2003), our focus is on analyzing in
detail the issue of transparency in terms of trade facilitation. This
paper adds to the literature by examining new dimensions of the
determinants of transparency – namely, the effects of losses; the
value of gifts expected in order to secure a government contract;
the value of gifts expected to obtain an import license or to get
things done; and the amount of documentation, time and expense
required to export and import. The framework to be introduced, in
the form of a 2×2 matrix that combines the “Doing Business Index”
and a “Bribery Index,” allows grouping countries and categorizing
them into four groups to get a better understanding of the available
strategies for International Trade.
Transparency has a key role in the avoidance of unnecessary
trade restrictions. This paper is not focused on how governments
can apply a number of non-tariff trade policy measures such as
technical standards, trade remedies, and quotas, which all are con-
sidered trade barriers. Rather, in this paper we  provide an analysis
of non-transparent practices, which are also called hidden trade
barriers (Helble, Shepherd, & Wilson, 2009). These hidden trade
barriers take the form of gifts, irregular payments for exports and
imports, and bribes.
Using a cost-beneﬁt approach, it is possible to save some costs
from transparency by deploying resources efﬁciently in customs.
But transparency could also involve the entire chain of import-
export operations, including not only traders, customs and other
regulatory authorities, but also private-sector participants such as
banks, customs brokers, insurance companies, freight forwarders
and other logistics service providers. It is well known that high
trade costs and weak logistics erode international trade business.
Conversely, it has been shown that transparency in a business
environment signiﬁcantly increases the ﬂow of international trade
(Duval & Utoktham, 2011). The beneﬁts that transparency brings
to international trade include: improving trader compliance; eas-
ing the logistics procedures; increasing the efﬁciency and guarding
against delays in port inventories and logistic hubs; and speeding
up documentary procedures among importers, exporters, traders,
freight forwarders, and other logistics providers (e.g., port opera-
tors, carriers), which actually reduces trade costs.
By observing costs, number of documents, and days required to
import and export as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2, it is possible to see
less bureaucracy in imports than in exports, in terms of the number
P. Bernal Turnes, R. Ernst / Investigaciones Europeas de D
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Sig. 1. Time and cost to export in the top 15 countries in number of documents to
xport (2012).
ource: World Bank Database.
f documents required in customs. However, unsurprisingly, the
umber of days and costs required to import are higher. Both asym-
etries give us a sense that there are barriers and protectionism to
estrict the free ﬂows of goods and services.
. The concept of transparency
The concept of transparency is sufﬁciently vague as to lend itself
o misinterpretation. Additionally, because it also encompasses a
ide variety of components, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a consensus on its
eﬁnition in the literature in the international trade arena (Atkin,
999; Halter, de Arruda, & Halter, 2009; Lee, 2012; Nelson, 2003).
Transparency is described as commonly shared knowledge
bout the economy, its performance, and the way policy inﬂuences
t (Tibana, 2003). In this sense, it is possible to ﬁnd conﬂicting
ndings about transparency, which may  actually hinder conﬂict
esolution, not aid it (Finel & Lord, 1999). These authors mea-
ure transparency based on the society’s capability to debate ideas
nd the government’s ability to control the ﬂow of information
nd disclose it to the public. Transparency is crucial to the effec-
iveness of international ﬂows of goods and services. Indeed, by
romoting transparency we are fostering the acquisition, analysis,
nd dissemination of regular, prompt, accurate and relevant infor-
ation (Mitchel, 1998). We  deﬁne transparency in international
rade as the fair, open and non-corruptive business and political
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environment. In this environment, we can make decisions with
decisive, accessible, timely and shared information. We  believe in
information sharing with stakeholders so we may  know and control
the risks, and protect and execute the rights of every party involved
in global trade.
Transparency has two main dimensions: predictability and
simpliﬁcation (Helble et al., 2009; Lejarraga & Shepherd, 2013).
Recently, accountability has become another key factor to con-
sider in transparency. Indeed, transparency is considered by Smithe
and Smith (2006) as the minimal standard for accountability. In
the context of international trade, predictability diminishes the
risks to do business abroad. Any unexpected procedure, quota or
certiﬁcate; any substantial change in the tariff rate applied; any
unpredictable aspect, rule, regulation, taxes or laws are all just
some examples of non-transparent practices that mean restrictions
for trading abroad. Examples of simpliﬁcation within transparency
can include: minimizing the number of documents required to
trade; increasing the speed and ﬂexibility of getting import per-
missions; easing the requirements for compliance to trade abroad;
and harmonizing procedures along the trade chain from producers
to end clients and through any service providers. Accountability in
the context of international trade is about the capacity to execute
the right to make the different entities responsible; the capacity to
agree warranties in contracts.
The traditional approach to transparency is focused exclusively
on the amount of information provided to any third party. Instru-
ments for public access to information generally fall into one of the
two categories: proactive and demand-driven. Proactive dissem-
ination refers to information that the government makes public
about its activities and performance. Demand-driven access refers
to an institutional commitment to respond to citizens’ requests for
speciﬁc kinds of information or documents which otherwise would
not be accessible. Both the dissemination of information and insti-
tutional answerability form the concept of transparency. Here is
where the accountability goes into action: the formal communi-
cation from a public institution or mutual agreements gives rise to
duties and rights which include the capability to sanction, compen-
sate, and/or remediate (Fox, 2007). Then, accountability includes
the responsibility of taking a political measure or making an agree-
ment.
4. Beneﬁts of being transparent
However transparency is not the panacea. Despite the impor-
tance attached to transparency, it remains elusive in practice. In
Fox’s words (2007), transparency has two  different colors: clear and
opaque. The distinction between clear and opaque transparency
depends on whether the information disclosed reveals or does not
reveal how institutions actually behave, in the sense of how they
make decisions or what the results of their actions are.
In any possible level of transparency between clear and opaque
as extreme sides of the same concept, stakeholders could have con-
ﬂicts of interests in the economy’s role within international trade
performance. Unsurprisingly, a descriptive analysis of a survey con-
ducted mainly in Asia concluded that inconsistency and confusion
in regulations and their implementation have a signiﬁcant nega-
tive economic impact on international business (Ching, Yuk-Pang,
& Zhang, 2004).
Klitgaard (1998) and Silva (1999) argue that the growth of trans-
parency in business combats corruption. Indeed, because the level
of transparency is difﬁcult to measure and is a “behind the scenes”
factor, corruption works as an indicator of a lack of transparency.
Corruption creates barriers that hinder ﬁrms from successfully
entering new markets. Corruption also reduces the efﬁciency and
the effectiveness of the business process along the international
4 s de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 21 (2015) 1–8
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Table 1
Matrix of Transparency in International Trade.
Bribery Index
Corruptive
environment
Non corruptive
environment
Doing Business
Index
Ease of doing
business
Blurry Transparent P. Bernal Turnes, R. Ernst / Investigaciones Europea
upply chain, from the producer to the end consumer. Often corrup-
ion in international trade only refers to the use of public ofﬁce for
rivate gains. In such cases, an ofﬁcial agent entrusted with carry-
ng out a task by the public (the principal) engages malfeasance for
rivate enrichment, which is difﬁcult to monitor for the principal
Bardhan, 1997). However, it is possible to ﬁnd corruptive transac-
ions in the private sector too: for instance, shipping goods using an
ncorrect tariff rate because it is cheaper than the rate that corre-
ponds to the actual goods traded. In terms of trade facilitation, it is
ossible to ﬁnd mechanisms to decrease both types of corruption,
lthough corruption in private business is more difﬁcult to detect
r to prove (Robertson, Gilley, & Crittenden, 2008).
Avoiding a discussion about what constitutes an immoral prac-
ice in a corruptive business environment, some authors argue
hat corruption improves efﬁciency and helps growth (Huntington,
968; Leff, 1964). This perspective explains how corruption can
e a viable option when government is too rigid or errs in its
ecisions, or when the public administration is inefﬁcient. Indeed,
ribing strategies should reach a Nash equilibrium by reducing time
osts (Lui, 1985) and serving as “lubricants” to a strict bureaucracy
Bardhan, 1997; Lui, 1985). Other models related to bribery are
vailable in the literature (Kleinrock, 1967; Naor, 1969). However
e found most literature indicates that corruption and weak gov-
rnment have negative effects on growth and trade (Dutt & Traca,
010; Mauro, 1995; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004). Dutt and
raca (2010) show that when the level of tariffs is high, the impact
f corruption displays an inverted U shape in which as long as the
evel of corruption is low, an increase in corruption expands trade
ows and vice versa if the initial level of corruption is high. More
peciﬁcally, it has been proven that the more a country trades the
ess corruption level it has (Knack & Azfar, 2003).
Corruption has an increasingly important indirect effect in
oday’s globalized economy, when ﬁrms risk a loss of reputation
f found trading using corrupt practices in foreign countries. For
his reason, ﬁrms avoid foreign markets without minimal ethical
tandards. The exposure to bad publicity might damage the entire
rm in each market, with negative effects for the ﬁrm in relation
o the end consumer. Today’s market and the stakeholders have
ore information about business issues and have the power to
oderate corruptive practices. For this reason, corruption plays a
ey role along the supply chain when trading abroad, because it as
n indicator of non-transparent business procedures.
Transparency International (2010) deﬁnes corruption as the
buse of entrusted power for private gain. This deﬁnition encom-
asses corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors.
hree quarters of the 178 countries on the 2010 Corruption Percep-
ion Index score below ﬁve on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10
very clean). This index is made up of 13 surveys and assessments,
ompiling questions relating to the bribery of public ofﬁcials, kick-
acks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds and the
trength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts
Rircart, Enright, Ghemawat, Hart, & Khanna, 2004). Although this
ndex is not measuring transparency in international trade, it is
seful to rank countries in corruptive practices. Ching et al. (2004)
easure the transparency of trade regulation in terms of incon-
istency, confusion in implementation and the lack of publicity of
egulations.
The continuing and increasing importance of transparency for
nternational trade is reported in many studies using a wide vari-
ty of approaches. For instance, Broll and Eckwert’s (2006) paper
tates that the information available on policy variables involves
ess uncertainty in the exchange rate. These authors modeled how
ncreased transparency in the foreign exchange market affects the
xport volume of an international ﬁrm.
Most studies explore how the availability of information and
he increased transparency help to minimize transportation costsDifﬁculty of
doing business
Opaque Muddy
(Håkanson & Dow, 2012) and/or increase proﬁt margins (Francois
& Manchin, 2007). Government and public institutions play a key
role in transparency in the international trade arena by engaging
in a broad range of ofﬁcial activities related to customs controls
and trade. Institutions support trade by providing information and
developing procedures related to import, export and transit, and
by issuing provisions related to transportation, ofﬁcial documenta-
tion, contract enforcement, property rights, commercial practices
and the use of international standards in trade procedures. In this
context, many studies underscore the importance of institutions in
trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) found that weak institu-
tions act as signiﬁcant barriers to trade internationally. Levchenko
(2007) proved that a high and similar institutional quality in export-
ing countries increases bilateral trade ﬂows.
5. Ease of doing business
From the perspective of international trade, the ease of doing
business refers to the cost, time and procedures necessary for
starting a business, obtaining construction permits, registering
properties, getting credits, protecting investors, paying taxes, trad-
ing across borders, enforcing contracts, employing workers and
accessing electricity and water. All these factors comprise the Doing
Business Index, which considers the aspects of business that matter
to ﬁrms and investors or affect the competitiveness of an economy
(World Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2013, 2014).
A fundamental premise of the Doing Business Index Report is
that economic activity requires good rules: rules that establish
and clarify property rights, reduce the cost of resolving disputes,
increase the predictability of economic interactions and provide
contractual partners with certainty and protection against abuse.
These regulations are designed to be efﬁcient, accessible and sim-
ple in their implementation (World Bank and International Finance
Corporation, 2013, 2014). Firms that want to trade abroad will be
exposed to potential challenges, necessitating a superior business
climate to reach end consumers successfully. That business climate
is supported by two  basic pillars: legal framework and efﬁciency of
procedures.
6. The transparent scenarios
By combining the concepts of ease of doing business with cor-
ruption we can develop the concept of transparency that helps
companies allocate resources to deal with different international
business environments. The Matrix of Transparency in Interna-
tional Trade is the framework proposed to evaluate countries on
the basis of their relative bribery rate and the ease of doing business
index (Table 1).
In the Matrix, Doing Business Index refers to the average ranking
on getting credit, protecting investors, enforcing contracts, resolv-
ing insolvency, employment workers, starting a business, dealing
with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property,
paying taxes, and trading across borders.
Bribery Index measures perceptions of corruption in the public
sector and refers to share average of ﬁrms expected to give gifts to
s de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 21 (2015) 1–8 5
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Corruptive environment Non corruptiveenvironment
Doing
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index  
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Difficulty of doing 
business
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Fig. 3. Matrix of Transparency in International Trade by economic areas.
Source: Data from the World Bank Database (2012). Area of bubbles represents exports
intensity, which is measured as a share of exports in GDP. The number inside each bubbleP. Bernal Turnes, R. Ernst / Investigaciones Europea
ublic ofﬁcials “to get things done”, percent of ﬁrms expected to
ive gifts in meetings with tax ofﬁcials, percent of ﬁrms expected
o give gifts to secure government contract, value of gift expected
o secure a government contract, percent of ﬁrms expected to give
ifts to get an operating license, percent of ﬁrms expected to give
ifts to get an import license, percent of ﬁrms expected to give
ifts to get a construction permit, percent of ﬁrms expected to give
ifts to get an electrical connection, percent of ﬁrms expected to
ive gifts to get a water connection, percent of ﬁrms experiencing
t least one bribe payment request, percent of ﬁrms identifying
orruption as a major constraint, and percent of ﬁrms identifying
he courts system as a major constraint.
From the matrix we  determine four quadrants into which coun-
ries can be classiﬁed: transparent, muddy, opaque, and/or blurry.
.1. Transparent quadrant
Transparent environments are countries highly ranked in ease
f doing business and low levels of briberies. Here, the procedures
o start up and run a business are well known and easily accom-
lishable. These countries offer simple customs procedures and a
ide access to credit. These countries also have a stable and favor-
ble legal framework for ﬁrms and provide to entrepreneurs fast
nd inexpensive legal instruments protecting them from infringe-
ents. Their openness to trade is due to fair rules consistently
pplied without briberies, gifts or illegal commissions. Transpar-
nt environments offer the minimum risks to trade: the rules and
rocedures in these countries are simple, inexpensive and fast with
air and incorruptible regulatory regimes. Additionally, we  ﬁnd a
igh level of competition for countries in this quadrant.
.2. Muddy quadrant
Muddy environments are countries ranked low in ease of doing
usiness and with low levels of bribery. In these countries, highly
ureaucratic processes to get licenses and permissions act as a bar-
ier to doing business efﬁciently. In general, they have outdated and
omplicated procedures that make running or trading with a busi-
ess slow and expensive. Usually, ﬁrms have difﬁculties getting
hese governments to disclose accurate information that directly
ffects their business there. Also, these countries often have uniﬁed
nd non-standardized trade and custom procedures, along with
igh government levies. Despite the ineffectiveness of their bureau-
ratic systems, these countries have strong governments with strict
echanisms to protect business against corruption. Thus, in muddy
nvironments we can calculate and determine risk in advance
ecause of the unwavering legal framework, even if the procedures
re slow, inefﬁcient and costly.
.3. Opaque quadrant
Opaque environments are countries ranked low in ease of doing
usiness and with high levels of bribery. Bureaucracy and cor-
uption are the two major difﬁculties in doing business in these
ountries. They have not yet developed the laws, regulations and
ormalities needed to encourage economic growth. Regulations
re complex and inefﬁcient; much time and many documents are
eeded for trade and the cost of doing business is high. Overly com-
licated rules and excessive documentation create opportunities
or corruption, which is sometimes rampant. Firms are asked to
rovide gifts to get import licenses and to provide commissions
nd bribes in exchange for approvals or permissions. The barriers of
nefﬁciency and corruption create the environment with the high-
st risk for ﬁrms operating in these countries. The procedures and
ules are difﬁcult to know, making it difﬁcult for ﬁrms to measure
isks. And even when ﬁrms have measured them, the economicrepresents the number of countries that are included in this study on each economic area
(see Annex 1 the countries considered in this ﬁgure).
system is so uncertain that the risks become unpredictable and the
legal framework does not ensure accountability
6.4. Blurry quadrant
Blurry environments are countries highly ranked in ease of
doing business and with a high level of bribery. In these countries,
the availability and accuracy of information make trade possible
in the private sector. Additionally, procedures for resolving dis-
putes and terminating partnerships are appropriate, accessible and
inexpensive. Despite the openness of these markets, there is a
gap between information and knowledge and some discretional
practices occur with an impartial administration. These countries
usually impose high government levies, have non-harmonized
procedures among commercial, ﬁnancial, logistic and regulatory
institutions and use modern technologies insufﬁciently. Simply put,
the public administration is corrupt. Usually the corruption appears
to “jump the queue” or to ﬁnd a shortcut. In summary, the risks are
predictable in these countries—however, those risks are high.
In Fig. 3 we  illustrate the application of the Matrix of Trans-
parency in International Trade to the main world economic areas.
Notice that the effect of the size of each country is represented
by the area of each bubble, calculated by the amount of exports
of goods and services divided by Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The Doing Business and Briberies axes cross in the median of both
values.
Some conclusions can be drawn from this matrix. First, it is pos-
sible to observe that the richest countries are the ones that have the
most transparent business environment. Second, the countries that
proportionally, as a share of GDP, have less trade internationally are
those with the highest level of briberies and the greatest difﬁculty of
doing business. High income and OECD high income countries are
the most welcoming and transparent regions to do business, fol-
lowed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the world’s second best
region for doing business) and Latin America and Caribbean (the
world’s second non-corruptive environment for doing business).
Although there is a clear linear negative relation between ease of
doing business and bribery, only when we  do an analysis at the
country level can we  see that the averages obscure big differences
among countries within the same economic area.
In Fig. 4 we  apply the same methodology as the previous matrix
with a non-random sample of countries as examples. The result-
ing matrix demonstrates the differences in transparency among
countries. The trade environments range from transparent (Estonia,
Chile, Hungary and Turkey among others) to opaque (Philippines,
Indonesia and Vietnam). China, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil have
noticeably low levels for ease of doing business, while Kazakhstan,
Vietnam and Ghana rank high on the bribery index. This matrix
also illustrates the differences among countries belonging to the
same economic area, such as Latin America and the Caribbean. In
this economic area some countries are spread out across the four
quadrants of the matrix.
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rubble represent exports intensity, which is measured as a share of exports in GDP (see
nnex 1 the countries considered in this ﬁgure).
The purpose of this matrix is not only to provide a visual way
f examining countries as possible destinations for investment or
rade. It also allows us to analyze the most suitable strategies to
evelop in each country based on its doing business and bribery
ndexes. For instance, transparent environments are recognized for
roviding the friendliest atmosphere for entrepreneurs, for tackling
orruption effectively and for ensuring a sustained commitment
o comprehensive changes that boost trade and investment. An
ppropriate strategy for these countries should be to apply cutting-
dge technologies to improve the harmonization of procedures, to
pply political reforms that boost business and increase produc-
ivity and to create the appropriate climate for dialogue between
ublic institutions and private ﬁrms in order to avoid corruption.
Muddy environments are those markets with unclear or ineffec-
ive rules, but notwithstanding maintain a low level of corruption.
y improving business regulation for entrepreneurs, it is possi-
le to promote greater entrepreneurship, improve productivity
nd facilitate international trade. By increasing the standardization
f procedures and improving the disclosure of information these
ountries can become more transparent. The weakness of these
arkets lies in the possibility of corruption if the procedures swell
r become very costly or inefﬁcient.
Firms must be cautious of the threats posed in opaque countries,
here not only are procedures unclear, but unethical practices
resent risks in trade and investment. Tackling corruption here
equires cooperation and dialogue among stakeholders, a system-
ide reform. Auditing institutions should be created or reformed to
ontrol the applicability of new clear regulations. In order to sub-
tantially improve the economy, governments must create clear
ules, disclose timely information, reduce taxes and simplify the
ureaucracy to do business. The creation of a business regulatory
nvironment and the standardization of procedures and govern-
bility policies are the best strategies to help businesses trust
fﬁcials, and ofﬁcials trust businesses.
In blurry environments the rules are sometimes ﬂouted to
rovide preferential treatment for elites. These markets need gov-
rnments to invest in institutional structures. The best strategy to
pply in blurry countries is to administer auditing policies check-
ng that regulations are applied equally. These countries have to
ake a ﬁrm commitment to detect the proceeds of corruption andhen to automate procedures to avoid discretionality. It is remark-
ble that self-assessment systems reduce the discretionary powers
f tax ofﬁcials and opportunities for corruption. These reforms
isk impeding, rather than facilitating, private sector activity.irección y Economía de la Empresa 21 (2015) 1–8
Governments must be careful to continually stimulate business
while ﬁghting corruption.
Clearly, performing a more rigorous grouping methodology
among regions or countries to analyze commonality elements could
expand the applicability and potential normative implications of
the Matrix. That is beyond the scope of this paper and material for
further research.
7. Conclusions
The increasing importance of transparency should not be taken
for granted. Transparency can increase efﬁciency in the whole logis-
tic chain. It is considered a valuable trade policy tool not only in
enhancing the efﬁcient implementation of trade rules, but also in
building multilateral trading systems to share information among
economic actors.
There are some contradictions in the basic principles of trans-
parency, as with the deployment of information of measures
(GATS 1995), in which the enforcement of rules is paradoxical
and controversial for the application of non-previously published
requirements to trade. In this sense, we believe that current inter-
national agreements need clearer rules to establish standardized
mechanisms of transparency.
The complex policy environment reﬂects the growing practice
of giving gifts to the public ofﬁcers. We  consider corruption to be
part of the non-transparent concept because it aids in the detection
and identiﬁcation of non-transparent practices. Inaccurate infor-
mation and uncertainties have a systematic impact on business by
increasing the risks of international trade. Transparency is a very
valuable mechanism with which to reduce volatility, uncertainty,
and unpredictability in the global logistic trade chain, which allows
then for the reduction of costs and risks in global trade.
The Matrix of Transparency in International Trade shows that
there are different levels of transparency in each economic area,
and even within the same economic area it is possible to see a wide
variety of transparent environments. This Matrix demonstrates the
relationship between the opportunity of doing business abroad and
the risk of that business based on the uncertainties and discretion-
ality in applying rules and procedures. The four different scenarios
show the trade policy implications and the strategies to improve
the consistency of policy to create a better environment to attract
trade and investments. A normative set of conclusions requires a
more rigorous grouping methodology across regions (or countries).
In this paper we chose the regions and countries to illustrate the
applicability of the framework.
We believe the paper contributes to the literature of Trans-
parency by providing a framework to emphasize global and local
fragilities of trading and investing internationally. We  conclude
that mechanisms need to be established allowing for the review
of the administration of measures, rules and procedures relat-
ing to trade in order to eliminate restrictions and to ensure their
impartial and consistent applicability. The problems of capac-
ity constraints at international organizations are compounded by
insufﬁcient domestic capacity to engage in transparent trade mon-
itoring. We  do agree with the idea that disclosure and accessibility
to information is not enough to ensure transparency (Atkin, 1999;
Lee, 2012; Nelson, 2003; Saha, Gounder, & Su, 2012). It is needed
to make this information understandable, clear and useful to pro-
vide the opportunity to take the right decisions internationally.
Also, the participation of stakeholders is needed to reach the coop-
eration that brings synergies and provide better services, which
helps also to bring transparency. Indeed, the true revolution of good
governance and transparency, as a tool that reduces corruption, is
through the participation processes that inﬂuence at the strategic
level of any international business.
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The development and efﬁcient communication of new trade
easures are not sufﬁcient to ensure transparency. Indeed, the
ost transparent markets are taking the initiative to enhance
ompetition and improve transparency. To be most effective, infor-
ation can no longer be managed by a handful of agencies, or even
 single government. Instead, solutions where transparency plays
 key role have been developed to share information among border
anagement agencies, importers, global manufacturers, brokers,
nd international governments (as with interoperability among
ingle Windows and the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain
ecurity in United States). Information is crucial for promoting
nternational cooperation and for developing multilateral informa-
ion systems. The cross-border exchange of electronic information
mong customs and stakeholders needs a reduction of informa-
ion asymmetries, along with the streamlining and simpliﬁcation
f business processes.Better institutional frameworks and con-
ultative mechanisms, harmonization and simpliﬁcation of trade
rocesses are the key mechanisms with which to increase trans-
arency. Future research in these areas is suggested, especially on
ow transparency of the trading environments can impact interna-
ional trade.
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nnex 1. Countries included in the data set
East Asia & Paciﬁc
runei Darussalam Malaysia Singapore
ambodia Marshall Islands Solomon Islands
hina Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Thailand
iji  Mongolia Timor-Leste
ong Kong SAR, China Palau Tonga
ndonesia Papua New Guinea Vanuatu
iribati Philippines Vietnam
ao  PDR Samoa
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
lbania Georgia Montenegro
rmenia Kazakhstan Romania
zerbaijan Kosovo Russian Federation
elarus Kyrgyz Republic Serbia
osnia and Herzegovina Latvia Tajikistan
ulgaria Lithuania Turkey
roatia Macedonia, FYR Ukraine
yprus Moldova Uzbekistan
Latin America & Caribbean
ntigua and Barbuda Dominican Republic Panama
rgentina Ecuador Paraguay
ahamas, The El Salvador Peru
arbados Grenada Puerto Rico
elize Guatemala St. Kitts and Nevis
olivia Guyana St. Lucia
razil Haiti St. Vincent and the Grenadines
hile Honduras Suriname
olombia Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
osta Rica Mexico Uruguay
ominica Nicaragua Venezuela, RB
Middle East & North Africa
lgeria Kuwait Syrian Arab Republic
ahrain Lebanon Tunisia
jibouti Malta United Arab Emirates
gypt, Arab Rep. Morocco West Bank and Gaza
ran, Islamic Rep. Oman Yemen, Rep.
raq Qatar
ordan Saudi Arabiairección y Economía de la Empresa 21 (2015) 1–8 7
OECD high income
Australia Hungary Poland
Austria Iceland Portugal
Belgium Ireland Slovak Republic
Canada Israel Slovenia
Czech Republic Italy Spain
Denmark Japan Sweden
Estonia Korea, Rep. Switzerland
Finland Luxembourg United Kingdom
France Netherlands United States
Germany New Zealand Poland
Greece Norway
South Asia
Afghanistan India Pakistan
Bangladesh Maldives Sri Lanka
Bhutan Nepal
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola Gabon Nigeria
Benin Gambia, The Rwanda
Botswana Ghana Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso Guinea Senegal
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Seychelles
Cameroon Kenya Sierra Leone
Cape Verde Lesotho South Africa
Central African Republic Liberia Sudan
Chad Madagascar Swaziland
Comoros Malawi Tanzania
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mali Togo
Congo, Rep. Mauritania Turkmenistan
Cote d’Ivoire Mauritius Uganda
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique Zambia
Eritrea Namibia Zimbabwe
Ethiopia Niger
High Income Countries
Australia Greece Portugal
Austria Hong Kong SAR, China Puerto Rico
Bahamas, The Hungary Qatar
Bahrain Iceland Saudi Arabia
Barbados Ireland Singapore
Belgium Israel Slovak Republic
Brunei Darussalam Italy Slovenia
Canada Japan Spain
Croatia Korea, Rep. St. Kitts and Nevis
Cyprus Kuwait Sweden
Czech Republic Luxembourg Switzerland
Denmark Malta Trinidad and Tobago
Equatorial Guinea Netherlands United Arab Emirates
Estonia New Zealand United Kingdom
Finland Norway United States
France Oman
Germany Poland
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